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Abstract   
Multiple studies have shown that more than half of aviation, aerospace and aeronautics incidents 
are attributed to human error.   Although many existing incident report systems have been 
beneficial for identifying engineering failures, most of them are not designed around a theoretical 
framework of human error, thus failing to address core issues and causes of the mishaps.  In 
addition, the collection and classification of human error data can be a challenge, including the 
causal factors that impact human behavior.  Therefore, it is imperative to develop a human error 
assessment framework to identify these causes [1].  The objective of this article is to provide a 
high-level literature overview and comparison of relevant human error assessment methods and 
provide an example of how one of these tools can be used to perform a human error analysis for 
complex space operations.   The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is 
one tool that can be used to categorize human error causal factors in a Space Operations 
environment.   Due to the uniqueness of Space Operations and its complexity, there are very 
limited Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) tools specifically established for identifying and 
assessing human error. It is recommended that further research be done to fill the gap of HRAs, 
as it applies specifically to Ground Processing Operations.   
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1.0 Introduction 
 Several published studies show various types of Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) 
tools that are used for human error analysis and human error probability. However, most of these 
tools were created from the aeronautics, aviation, mining, nuclear power or chemical process 
industry perspective.  Due to the uniqueness of Space Operations and its complexity, it is 
imperative that Human Reliability Assessment tools are established as specific resources for 
identifying and assessing human error in a Space Exploration environment.  Research reveals that 
70-80% of all aviation incidents involve human factors [19].   In the field of Human Factors, there 
are several Human Reliability Assessment tools for measuring human error and its probability; 
however, amongst the various types, there are none specifically designed for complex space 
operations, such as National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Ground Processing 
Operations.  The purpose of this article is to provide a high-level overview and comparison of 
relevant human error assessment methods and tools for human error analysis and error prediction, 
with the objective of highlighting one of the tools and providing an example of how this tool can 
be used to perform a human error analysis for complex space operations.  These methods and their 
comparisons can be found in Appendix A.  Out of the 15 HRAs listed in this article, the Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) will be highlighted and a case study 
provided to demonstrate its applicability to human error analysis in Space Operations.  The 
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HFACS was selected for this article due to its broad analysis of human error that considers multiple 
causes of human failure [21].  One of the benefits to using HFACS is that the generic terms and 
descriptors allow it to be used for a range of industries and activities [14,1].   
In this article, NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations was used as the main reference 
data, due to the fact that it is a major vehicle spaceport.  
1.1 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)  
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is largely based on 
James Reason’s Generic Error Modeling systems (GEMS) conceptual framework, with the 
framework’s intent to identify the origin of basic human error types [13, 1].  The HFACS lists 
human errors at each of the four levels of failure: 1) Unsafe Acts of Operators, 2) Preconditions 
for Unsafe Acts, 3) Unsafe Supervision, and 4) Organizational Influences (which can be multiple 
causes) [21].  Nineteen (19) causal categories within the four categories of level of failures are also 
established for human failure [1]. 
Developed by Dr. Scott Shappell and Dr. Doug Wiegmann, HFACS serves as a response 
to data from the Navy and Marine Corp that recognized human error as the leading primary cause 
for approximately 80% of all of their flight accidents.  HFACS is used to categorize human causes 
of accidents and serves as a means to assist in the investigation of those causes.  It also helps 
identify human causes of accidents, with the objective of establishing training and prevention 
efforts [21,1].   
2.0 Methodology  
The case study presented in this article exhibits how the HFACS system can be used to 
categorize existing human factors in a complex ground processing operation.  The incident was 
selected and used because of the SpaceShipTwo (SS2) rocket powered test flight, similar aspects 
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of space flight and its systems complexity.    For illustration purposes, this article will not focus on 
the accident causal factors.  This will be left to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
report to identify the accident causal factors.  
According to Chandler [3], “Ground processing (as it relates to Space Mission Human 
activity) includes a wide variety of human activities, such as system design, manufacturing and 
systems acquisition, vehicle assembly, preparation of science payloads, payload assembly, 
integrated vehicle and payload processing and test, vehicle maintenance and repair, transport of 
the vehicle, and crew launch day preparation” (p. 154). 
The incident used in this case study had an official investigation report performed by the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For this article, the final report was used as a 
primary source of information for the SpaceShipTwo rocket test flight mishap. 
Because the NTSB investigation is one report concerning the SpaceShipTwo rocket test 
flight mishap, there may be additional reports generated on this same topic.  Some readers of this 
article may have additional information to what is represented, some readers may disagree on the 
analysis, methodology, approach, etc.  The goal of this case study is to not reinvestigate or 
recreate the accident.  The case study will be performed solely on the information made readily 
available and within the bounds of the NTSB report.   
2.1 Case Study analysis using HFACS 
In Flight Breakup During Test Flight Scaled Composites SpaceShipTwo: “On October 
31, 2014, at 1007:32 Pacific daylight time, the SpaceShipTwo (SS2) reusable suborbital rocket, 
N339SS, operated by Scaled Composites LLC (Scaled), broke up into multiple pieces during a 
rocket-powered test flight and impacted terrain over a 5-mile area near Koehn Dry Lake, 
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California. The pilot received serious injuries, and the copilot received fatal injuries.  SS2 was 
destroyed, and no one on the ground was injured as a result of the falling debris. [11]” 
When conducting a HFACS analysis, there are many ways this can be performed.  In the 
structured format of the NTSB investigation and analysis report used in this article, the executive 
summary served as a starting point for presenting the information and conducting the analysis, 
then it was worked backwards in time from that point.  For the case analysis, this article will follow 
the same process.   
When using HFACS as a classifying tool, the categorization process can be a two or three 
step process, which is dependent upon the Classification level you are working with [22].  The 
levels are: Unsafe Acts (Level 1), Preconditions of Unsafe Acts (Level 2), Unsafe Supervision 
(Level 3) and Organizational Influence (Level 4) (Fig. 1).  Figure 1 shows the four levels, with 
sublevels.  There are some specific casual factor examples for the lower sublevels, but they are not 
included in the figure 1, but can be found in HFACS reference material [21,22].  
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Figure 1: Steps required to classify causal factors using Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) [22]   
Prior to the SS2 accident, it was the SS2 co-pilot’s decision to unlock the feather just after 
the SpaceShipTwo rocket reached 0.8 Mach speed.  Per the fight test, the data used during the 
flight test specified that the feather was to be unlocked during the boost phase when the SS2 
reached 1.4 Mach [11].  This requirement was to serve as a mitigation to the potential hazard of 
the SS2 vehicle’s reentry with the feather down, as a result of a lock failure [11]. 
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The co-pilot’s decision to unlock the feather at the wrong Mach speed, was an unsafe act, 
which places this action under the Level 1, unsafe acts of operations category.  Under this category 
there are two sublevel categories: “error” and “violation.”  The next step is to determine what type 
of error and/or violation it was.  Based on the action of the co-pilot, this was an error of the co-
pilot, established on a decision he made, so this would fall under the decision error Level 1 
subcategory.  In a post interview with the surviving pilot, the NTSB report documents, “The pilot 
stated that he was unaware during the flight that the copilot had unlocked the feather early. The 
pilot also stated that he and the copilot were briefed “multiple” times that the copilot was to unlock 
the feather at 1.4 Mach [11].”  Knowing that the pilot and co-pilot were briefed the correct process 
multiple times for unlocking the feather, the co-pilot’s action was also a violation.  
Per James Reason, an exceptional violation, is one that is considered an isolated departure 
from authority, not necessarily indicative of an individual’s typical behaving pattern [12].  This 
violation is also commonly referred to as “bending the rules.”  Due to the fact that this was a first 
of a future flight test, and was not a routinely performed operation, this action would fall under the 
exceptional violation category.   
While continuing with the analysis, per the NTSB report, as a part of the rocket powered 
flight test, an experimental permit was required in order to perform the test.  This required Scaled 
Composites to complete and submit an experimental permit application to the Federal Aviation 
Administration's (FAA) Office of Commercial Space Transportation’s (AST), (FAA/AST) for 
review and approval [11].  As a part of the process regulation there is a hazard analysis requirement 
per 14 CFR 437.55, which required Scaled Composites to “identify and describe those hazards that 
could result from human errors.”  In Scaled Composites’ SS2 hazard analysis, they did not identify 
and document the likelihood that “a pilot could prematurely unlock the feather systems, which 
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would permit the feather to extend under conditions that could lead to a catastrophic failure of the 
vehicle’s structure [11].”   Rather, Scaled Composites presumed the pilots would have received 
appropriate training by means of simulation sessions, therefore equipping them to know how to 
accurately operate the feather system, per the standard and emergency procedures for a specified 
situation [11].    Despite the fact that the flight crewmember had extensive flight test experience 
and completed many preflight simulations, in which the feather was unlocked at the appropriate 
1.4 Mach speed, this accident is testament that errors can still occur [20]. 
Due to Scaled Composites’ failure to identify and document the likelihood of a premature 
feather unlocking as a potential hazard and its appropriate control or mitigation for this, this falls 
under the Level 3 unsafe supervision category.  This lack of identification reduced the 
effectiveness of any type of mitigation, because this possibility was not identified as a hazard. 
More specifically, because Scaled Composites’ leadership failed to identify and provide mitigation 
to correct a known (possible) problem, this would fall under the failure to correct a known problem 
subcategory. 
For demonstration purposes, the NTSB report does not state if the simulation training 
sufficiently trained the crewmembers; however, if this was the case (e.g. insufficient training), then 
this would also fall under the Level 3 unsafe supervision, subcategory inadequate supervision with 
causal example failed to provide proper training. In this analysis, some questions to consider 
would be “Did the simulation training environment provided fail the crew members?”  “Was it 
adequate for them?”  If this was the case (training environment failure and inadequacy), then this 
would fall under the preconditions of unsafe acts Level 2, under the environmental factors, and 
technological environment subcategories.  However, as stated before, this is not known from the 
report.   
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The FAA/AST granted Scaled Composites its initial experimental permit, first and second 
renewals of the permit.  Following the first renewal, the FAA/AST performed an additional review 
of SS2’s hazard analysis, which was a part of Scaled Composites’ application, and made the 
decision that the hazard analysis failed short of the 14 CFR 437.55(a)’s software and human error 
requirements [11]. Consequently, for the first renewal of the experimental permit, the FAA/AST 
provided a waiver from these hazard analysis requirements.  The waiver was not requested by 
Scaled Composites, nor were they involved in the assessment process, nor did they provide 
feedback concerning the waiver, prior to its administration.  The FAA/AST also provided 
additional waivers from these hazard analysis requirements as part of the second renewal.  It was 
determined by the FAA/AST that the waivers were in the public interest and would not increase 
risk to public health. The FAA/AST also decided that despite the fact the Scaled Composites 
hazard analysis was not compliant to the software and human error requirements, that particular 
mitigations that were put in place by Scaled Composites would inhibit such error results.   
Nonetheless, the waivers provided by the FAA/AST lacked the proper awareness of whether the 
mitigations would sufficiently safeguard from “a single human error with catastrophic consequents 
[11].”  Also, none of the mitigations were determined to adequately ensure public safety [11].  
When performing a HFACS analysis, some causal factors may not be identified within the 
HFACS framework, because they are not typically within an organization’s sphere of influence 
[22].  These factors are rather considered outside influences that have the likelihood of contributing 
to an accident [22].  The FAA/AST’s decision to determine that the waivers were in the public’s 
best interest and would not increase health, safety, property, and national security risks, along with 
the fact that FAA/AST’s waiver lacked coordination and proper awareness with SS2, would be 
considered an outside influence.  
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Lastly, based on the incident report, Scaled Composites overlooked an opportunity to 
recognize design and/or operations requirements, due to their lack of human factors application 
and consideration as a “potential cause of uncommand feather extension on the SS2[11].”  
As a result of Scaled Composites’ lack of human factors consideration in the design, 
operation procedures, hazard analysis and flight crew simulation training, this causal factor would 
be classified as a failure to correct known design flaws, which falls under the resource management 
category under the 4th Level organizational influences. 
 
3.0 Results  
As it relates to flight accidents, generally most accidents could have been impeded at 
several levels (Fig. 2).  Due to Scaled Composites’ lack of human factors consideration in several 
levels and aspects of the experimental flight, this contributed to and established the grounds for a 
potential accident.  However, there were several other causal factors that contributed to the 
incident, such as the co-pilot’s decision to unlock the feather at the wrong Mach speed, and the 
FAA/AST’s decision to approve waivers without coordination and proper awareness with SS2.  
Figure 2 illustrates how failed defenses in Reason’s Swiss cheese model [13] led to an accident.  
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Figure 2: Summary of Scaled Composites’ SpaceShipTwo In Flight Breakup during Test Flight [11, 22]   
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4.0 Discussion  
Amongst the HRA methodologies discussed in Appendix A, none of them were developed 
specifically for aerospace and spaceflight applications.  They were created from a myriad of tools 
developed from an aeronautics, aviation, mining, nuclear power or chemical process industry 
perspective.   
The review in Appendix A reveals that the topic of adequate current HRAs for complex 
systems, should continue to be discussed.  It is recommended that existing validated HRAs that 
have been used to successfully perform analyses on similar complex operations, such as the ones 
listed in Appendix A of this article, but not limited to, be modified to address unique complex 
systems in a Space Operations environment.   
Discussion for a modified version of an existing validated HRA methodology and 
framework should be considered for the development of future complex space operations, such as 
Ground Processing Operations (GPO).  Some examples of potential human error causal factors in 
Ground processing operations are: poor access, excessive task loading, failure to stop work due to 
a safety/hazard concern, failure to complete procedure steps, confined space, etc. [1].   
This article focused on one the HRAs considered in the HRAs selected by the NASA 2006 
study (i.e. HFACS); however, this does not encompass all of the existing HRAs available for 
consideration (e.g., social-technical approaches, etc.).  The NASA 2006 study team selected four 
HRAs (THERP, CREAM, NARA and SPAR-H), stating that these methods individually did not 
meet all of NASA’s selection criteria [3].   Therefore, the concept of modifying existing HRAs for 
complex space operations, should be considered.  These modified HRAs, frameworks and 
methodologies are not limited to one HRA, but could consist of a hybrid of two or more HRAs.   
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Considerations for a modified existing HRA are below: 
1) Modify an existing HRA by identifying aspects of the specific complex operation that 
can be matched to the task, performance shaping factors, levels of failures, etc.  
2) Identify other HRAs equivalent in nature and the risks that can be modified to fit the 
criteria or needs of a specific complete operation, such as ground processing 
operations.  
3) Review the existing complex space operation’s historical data to build a framework 
and modify an existing HRA.  
4) Validate the developed framework and modified HRA for use.    
Using HFACS as an example for Ground processing operations, the subcategories of the 
HFACS tool can be modified to reflect the specific tasks performed within that operation.  For 
example, under the Level 2 preconditions of unsafe supervision subcategory of failure to correct 
a known problem, the subcategory example failure to stop work due to a safety/hazard concern 
(GPO causal factor stated earlier) could be added to the subcategory, due to this being a potential 
causal factor in KSC ground processing operations. 
5.0 Conclusion  
The case study in this report exhibits how the HFACS tool can be used to categorize human 
error causal factors in an investigation or retrospectively in order to incorporate mitigations from 
lessons learned for future operations.  Although this case study primarily focused on an accident 
investigation, this tool can also be used to proactively conduct human factors risk assessments 
throughout the design process.  The case study shows that the HFACS analysis tool can be used 
for ground processing operations; therefore, if it is not determined that it can meet the specific 
criteria (as stated in the NASA study 2006), then a modified version could be established and 
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followed.  Using the process identified in the Discussion section, this tool can be modified to 
analyze other complex operations.  Even though it is difficult to fully demonstrate in an article 
how this tool can be used, it can be seen how a similar process could be used to identify human 
casual factors.    
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APPENDIX A 
In 2006, research was done by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) 
with experienced HRA analysts to evaluate the current literature and source of HRAs that are 
prevalent today [3].   The NASA guidance discussed applicable HRAs for NASA applications and 
highlighted methods that can support Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) [3]. 
This paper will also provide a comparison between the advantages, disadvantages and 
applicability to complex space operations of the HRAs listed in the OSMA study as well as other 
prevalent HRAs.  
1.  Human Reliability Assessments (HRA) 
Human Reliability Assessments (HRA) are designed to help reduce the likelihood of error 
[7].  HRAs deal with analyzing the human error potential within a system that typically happens 
within a quantitative risk assessment framework [7]. HRA approaches are typically grouped into 
two classifications; those using databases and others using expert opinion [7].  Human Error 
Identification (HEI) approaches are typically grouped into two categories as well: qualitative and 
quantitative.  The qualitative approach is used to define the type of errors that occur within a 
specific system.  The quantitative approach delivers a numerical probability that an error can occur 
within that system [18].    
An important part of an HRA is the identification of Performance Shaping Factors or 
Contributing Factors to the human error incident.  HRA Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) are 
defined as causes that can affect human performance [8].   
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Studies have shown that very few HRA methods provide step by step procedures or 
processes for following the HRA process [3]. To date there is no known process specifically and 
uniquely created for all aspects of NASA’s Ground Processing Operations.  The current body of 
knowledge concerning this effort is dependent upon using the current HRA methodologies that 
exist to perform and meet the HRA needs for these operations, thus causing human error analysts 
to use some combination of HRA methods [3]. 
  Complex space operations, such as NASA KSC Ground Processing Operations are very 
unique and require a methodology that is specifically developed for identifying, evaluating, 
calculating the human error probability, and categorizing remedial measures to reduce human 
error incidents during ground processing operations.   
A comparison table of the advantages and disadvantages of the HRAs that were 
selected by the NASA OSMA 2006 study for HRA Comparison, along with additional HRAs 
are provided in Table A.1.  The HRAs were selected because they are considered current HRA 
tools used in High Hazard Human system interface design [24], and others for their potential 
applicability to complex systems, such as NASA Ground Processing Operations.  The criteria 
for this study’s selection is provided in Table A.2.   
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Table A.1: HRA Advantage and Disadvantage Comparison Table [1] 
Human Error 
Identification Methods 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Systematic Human Error 
Production and Prediction 
Approach (SHERPA) 
Offers organized and 
complete approach to 
human error prediction, 
Easy to use method; Error 
classification is generic, 
thus allowing it to be used 
in various fields.  Proven 
successful in a number of 
other domains [18].      
 Exhausting and time 
consuming for large 
complex tasks; Task 
Analysis adds addition time 
and does not consider 
system organization errors 
[18].      
Human Error Template 
(HET)  
HET method is easy to use 
and implement; error codes 
are generic and can be used 
for different fields; the 
classification helps cue the 
analyst for probable errors 
[18].      
This tool can be tedious for 
complex large tasks; Tool 
does not address the 
cognitive aspect of errors, 
Tool only deals with the 
system or organization error 
and only focuses on the 
most difficult aspects of 
system operations [18].      
Technique for the 
Retrospective and Predictive 
Analysis of Cognitive 
Errors (TRACEr) 
Emerges as a complete 
method for error prediction 
and analysis [18].      
Despite the appearance of a 
complete system, it also 
appears to be unnecessarily 
complicated.  There are no 
verified confirmations of 
studies successfully using 
this method, For Complex 
tasks this tool can be tedious 
[18].      
Task Analysis for Error 
Identification (TAFEI) 
Organized and exhaustive 
procedure; Flexible basic 
approach [18].      
Methodology is not a quick 
approach; Resource 
intensive, taking a long time 
to reach the end for even 
mild complex systems [18].      
Human Error (HAZOP) 
 
Methodology is usable in 
different fields; Known as 
an easy to learn and use 
tool; Guidewords can be 
used in different fields, due 
to its generic terms [18].      
Application is time 
consuming.  Methodology 
generates large data that has 
to be documented and 
assessed.  Tool can be labor 
intensive [18].      
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Human Error 
Identification Methods 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Technique for human Error 
Assessment (THEA) 
THEA is an organized 
approach; a Generic tool 
that can be used in different 
fields; THEA’s questions 
assist in the analyst 
identifying probable errors.  
THEA can be resource 
intense and the analysis time 
consuming; There is limited 
validation evidence 
associated with THEA. 
System for Predictive Error 
Analysis and Reduction 
(SPEAR) 
Structured approach; Easy 
to learn, use and apply; Uses 
generic terms allowing it to 
be used in various fields 
[18].      
Methodology time 
consuming for complex 
operations; Cognitive aspect 
of human error is not 
considered; Appears to be 
very similar to SHERPA 
Human Error Assessment 
and Reduction Technique 
(HEART) 
Useful for prediction and 
quantifying human error 
likelihood or failure within 
complex systems; Easy to 
use; Minimal training 
required [1]. 
HEART Methodology is 
subjective to SME 
assessment, thus affecting 
the consistency [1]. 
The Cognitive Reliability 
and Error Analysis Method 
(CREAM) 
Considered an organized 
system approach to 
quantifiably identifying 
human error; Very detailed 
[1]. 
Time consuming to 
implement; May be 
considered complicated for 
a novice analyst; Appears 
complicated in application 
[1].  
Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System 
(HFACS) 
Helps categorize and 
classify human error into 
four levels of failures [1].  
Originally developed for 
Navy and Marine Corp. Will 
need to be modified for use in 
other fields [1]. 
Technique for Human Error 
Rate Prediction (THERP) 
THERP can be used for task 
performance prediction while 
designing the Human System 
Integration (HSI) interaction. 
[24]. 
THERP does not offer clear 
processes for performing 
error identification [3]. 
Human Error Risk 
Management for 
Engineering Systems 
(HERMES) 
The HERMES methodology 
has presented proficiency and 
usefulness in an actual and 
complex application [24]. 
The application of HERMES 
is restricted to 
the identification of safety 
critical factors, or Indicators 
of Safety (IoS), and their 
dissemination into RSA-
Matrices that serve the 
resolution of outlining the 
existing level of safety within 
the organization 
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Human Error 
Identification Methods 
Advantages Disadvantages 
and describing the position 
methods for audits in the 
future [18].     
Nuclear action reliability 
assessment (NARA) 
Similar to HEART method; 
Provides more specific 
information for generic 
tasks [17]. 
NARA does not provide 
clear direction on task 
decomposition [3]. 
Standardized Plant Analysis 
Risk HRA Method (SPAR-H) 
Projected to be a simple 
HRA method for estimated 
human error probabilities in 
plants. 
SPAR-H does not 
specifically explain its 
HEPs terms “action” and 
“diagnosis” failures [3]. 
SPAR-H does not offer 
much direction for error 
identification.  
Human Error Rate 
Assessment and Optimizing 
System (HEROS) 
The importance of the 
Performance Shaping Factors 
(PSF) and Performance 
Influence Factor (PIF) values 
can be calculated for 
optimizing the man-machine 
system [15]. 
Even though is it minimized, 
there is still some level of 
subjectivity when vague 
linguistic statements on PSFs 
are selected and modified, 
then conveyed into 
expressions of fuzzy numbers 
or intervals to allow 
mathematical operations to be 
performed on them [15]. 
 
  
Multiple studies of the listed HRAs in the table above, show that these methods were 
not designed for ground processing operations.  Many were designed for complex operations, 
such as the Nuclear Reprocessing Industry, Air Traffic Control, Chemical processing industry, 
and the Civil Aviation field, but not specifically for the Space Exploration.  Due to NASA’s 
unique operations, the HRAs and PSFs used in Space Operations would need to relate to ground 
processing operations, zero gravity, microgravity and isolation on crew performance to effectively 
deal with human error for Space Exploration [3, 1].   
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This review’s focus is on NASA Ground Processing Operations, and the HRAs discussed 
above do not address the unique aspect of hardware that will be processed during Ground 
Operations and eventually placed into a zero-gravity environment.   
In the NASA 2006 study, Ground processing operations is considered one of 6 categories 
in which NASA human activities relate to Space Flights.  The remaining 5 categories consist of 
Space Flight Dynamic Phases, Intra Vehicular Activities (IVA), Extra Vehicular Activities (EVA), 
Destination and Surface Operations and Earth Landing [3].   
 
2.0 NASA 2006 HRA Attributes and Selection     
In the NASA 2006 study, the attributes selected for evaluation, used and compared for the HRA 
Method were provided.  Below are two tables (Table A.2 and Table A.3) listing the attributes 
and HRA selections for review.    
Table A.2: NASA Attributes used for HRA Method Comparison [3] 
NASA Attributes used for HRA Method Comparison 
1 Development Context 
2 Screening 
3 Task Decomposition 
4 PSF List and Causal Model 
5 Coverage 
6 HEP Calculation Procedure 
7 Error-Specific HEPs 
8 Task Dependencies and Recovery 
9 HEP Uncertainty Bounds 
10 Level of Knowledge Required 
11 Validation 
12 Reproducibility 
13 Sensitivity 
14 Experience Base 
15 Resource Requirements 
16 Cost and Availability 
17 Suitability for NASA Applications 
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Table A.3: NASA HRA Selection [3] 
NASA HRA Selection [3] 
1. Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction 
2. Accident Sequence Evaluation Program  
3. Success Likelihood Index Methodology  
4. Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
5. Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique 
6. Nuclear Action Reliability Assessment  
7. A Technique for Human Event Analysis  
8. Connectionism Assessment of Human Reliability 
9. Standardized Plant Analysis Risk HRA Method  
10. University of Maryland Hybrid  
11. Commission Errors Search and Assessment  
12. Human Factors Process Failure Modes & Effects Analysis 
13. Time Reliability Correlation  
14. EPRI Caused Based Decision Tree  
 
The NASA OSMA study evaluated 14 HRA methods against 17 attributes for HRA 
comparison.  The focus of their applicability was to concentrate on the various human interfaces 
for hardware preservation activities.  The study’s prime focus was to propose recommendations 
for the “quantitative analysis of space flight crew human performance in the support of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA)” [3].    
Because of the NASA 2006 assessment, 4 HRA methods were selected as an appropriate 
aerospace application when leading NASA PRAs.  These methods are:  The Technique for Human 
Error Rate Prediction (THERP), Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM), 
Nuclear Actions Reliability Assessment (NARA) and Standardized Plant Analysis Risk HRA 
Method (SPAR-H) [3]. Nonetheless, the study identified that these 4 methods did not meet all of 
the NASA selection criteria individually.  These methods were also selected for completed 
Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) on new space flight vehicle system designs.  They were 
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not selected for Ground Processing Operations, which include processing hardware, vehicle 
maintenance and processing [3].    
According to the NASA 2006 study, CREAM was used in two NASA Probabilistic Risk 
Assessments (PRAs).  One for a Space Shuttle Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) and 
another for the International Space Station HRA.  At that time no results of the HRAs were publicly 
released.  The current applicability of CREAM’s human error probability in relation to NASA’s 
specific tasks were still under review [3].   
The NASA OSMA assessment determined that Ground processing activities better 
complemented the conditions for which THERP was established; however, this methodology did 
not address human performance in flight, zero gravity, or microgravity environments [3].    
 
“The views and opinions expressed in this article represent the personal opinions of the 
author and do not reflect the opinions of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or 
the Kennedy Space Center.”  Tiffaney Miller Alexander, PhD 
 
 
 
